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Abstract
In July 2004, the Belgian government intensiﬁed monitoring within the Unemployment
Insurance scheme. Workers claiming unemployment beneﬁts for more than 13 months
are notiﬁed that past job-search behavior will be monitored 8 months later. In one re-
gion the target group is counseled shortly after the notiﬁcation, while in others not or
only once the monitoring has taken place. We exploit the discontinuity in the treatment
assignment at the age of 30 to evaluate the threat effect of the notiﬁcation on the proba-
bility of employment. We ﬁnd that the effect is heterogeneous and critically depends on
whether and when notiﬁed workers are counseled.
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The Luxembourg European Council of November 1997 included active labor market policies
as an essential ingredient of the Employment Guidelines set out for the member states of the
European Union. By now it has become common knowledge that not all of these policies
are equally effective in combating unemployment (see e.g. Martin and Grubb, 2001; Kluve,
2006). A number of studies have identiﬁed the monitoring of search behavior of the unem-
ployed coupled with sanctions as a promising tool for enhancing the transition from unem-
ployment to work(Meyer, 1995; Dolton and O’Neill, 1995, 1996; Gorter and Kalb, 1996; Blun-
dell et al., 2004; Graversen and van Ours, 2006). Indeed, for risk averse workers, these policy
instruments may deliver the right incentives by imposing less costs than alternatives, such
as incomplete coverage or ﬁnite entitlement to unemployment beneﬁts (Boone et al., 2001).
However, since in these studies monitoring of search behavior was never offered in isolation
of counseling, it is difﬁcult to disentangle which policy drives the ﬁndings.
A number of recent studies challenge the view that monitoring of job search of unemployed
workers is effective.1 First, Crépon et al. (2006) ﬁnd that a number of intensive job search
assistance programs in France without any threat of sanction accelerate the transition to
employment and, in particular, delay the re-entry in unemployment. This proves that mon-
itoring is not a necessary condition for success. Second, it is clear that employment ofﬁcers
can only verify formal proofs of job search behavior. van den Berg and van der Klaauw
(2006) show that, as a consequence, monitoring may substitute informal by formal job search
and that the total job search intensity among workers predominantly using informal search
channels may even decline. Thirdly, Manning (2005) shows that the imposition of stricter
job search requirements does not enhance search incentives for all workers, since, if behav-
ior is followed-up too closely, workers may ﬁnd it too onerous to continue claiming beneﬁts.
As a consequence, these workers leave the claimant population and search less intensively.
Finally, Klepinger et al. (1997, 2002) report the outcomes of a social experiment especially
designed to evaluate the effect of alternative work-search requirements within Unemploy-
ment Insurance (UI) in the United States. This study conﬁrms that monitoring may reduce
the duration of beneﬁt claim,2 but that it neither speeds up the transition to employment nor
has any impact on the level of subsequent earnings.
1This does not imply that the sanction associated to the monitoring isn’t effective (see e.g. van den Berg et
al., 2004; Abbring et al., 2005; van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2005).
2Ashenfelter et al. (2005) ﬁnd insigniﬁcant effects, but Klepinger et al. (2002, p.19) claim that the discrepancy
with their conclusions is essentially caused by the smaller sample size of Ashenfelter et al.’s study, resulting in
less precision.
1Even if the monitoring activity as such does not promote the transition from unemployment
to work, the threat of monitoring may do. Indeed, if unemployed workers dislike being mon-
itored, they will try to avoid it by searching harder for jobs before the employment ofﬁcers
start following-up their behavior. If so, we should regard this anticipatory effect as an inte-
gral part of the treatment effect of monitoring. In this paper we examine whether the new
follow-up scheme enacted by the Belgian government in July 2004 entails important effects
of this kind.
The threat effect of unemployment beneﬁt exhaustion has been extensively studied in the
literature (see e.g. van den Berg, 1990; Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2006). This literature pro-
vides convincing evidence that incentives to search for and to accept jobs increases signiﬁ-
cantly as unemployed workers approach the moment at which beneﬁts expire. Only recently
researchers have started to investigate whether the prospect of mandatory participation to
active labor market policies have a similar impact on the behavior of unemployed workers
(Black et al., 2003; Rosholm and Svarer,2004; Geerdsen,2006; Geerdsenand Holm, 2007; Gra-
versen and van Ours, 2006; Forslund and Nordström Skans, 2006; Hägglund, 2006). They
have shown that these threat effects can be as large as those resulting from a ﬁnite entitle-
ment of unemployment beneﬁts and that they may form a major share of the total impact on
the return to employment. A major concern remains, however. The threat of participation
may accelerate the transition to work at the expense of the quality of the job. van Ours and
Vodopivec (2006) report that shortening the potential duration of unemployment beneﬁts in
Slovenia did not affect the contract type (temporary versus permanent), neither the employ-
ment duration nor the wage of the post-unemployment job. In this study we only have very
partial information regarding the quality of the job. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd some evidence
that the threat of monitoring induces workers to accept lower quality jobs, but that this neg-
ative effect can be undone if these workers are appropriately counseled.
We estimate the impact of the threat of monitoring on the probability of employment on the
basis of a regression-discontinuity (RD) analysis (Campbell, 1969; Hahn et al., 2001). This ap-
proach is appealing, since it allows, as in an experimental setting, to identify the treatment
effect under very weak assumptions. We can follow this approach, because the Belgian gov-
ernment phased in the monitoring scheme gradually according to age group. Between June
2004 and June 2005 only unemployed workers younger than 30 years were obliged to par-
ticipate in the new scheme. In this study we analyze the effect of the new scheme during
this initial phase. This means that we exploit the discontinuity in the treatment assignment
at the age of 30.
The outline of the article is as follows. In the next section we describe the institutional set-
2ting and the features of the new monitoring scheme. In Section 3 we discuss the sample
selection criteria and provide descriptive statistics of the data. Section 4 presents the estima-
tion method. Section 5 reports the main ﬁndings for the benchmark model and relates them
to the predictions of a theoretical model developed in the Appendix. Section 6 considers
some robustness checks and extends the analysis to other outcome variables. A ﬁnal section
concludes.
2 Institutional Setting
Belgium is a federal state consisting of three language Communities (the French, the Flemish
and a small German one) and of three Regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels). In Flanders
the ofﬁcial language is Dutch (Flemish), in Wallonia it is French and the large majority of the
inhabitants of Brussels speak French, a minority Dutch or other languages.3 Flanders is cur-
rentlythemostprosperousregion. In2004, theILO-unemploymentratewas5.4%onaverage
in Flanders, where it was as high as 12.0% in Wallonia and 15.7% in Brussels (Massant, 2005).
Within this institutional setting, Social Insurance, of which Unemployment Insurance (UI)
is one division, is organized at the federal level. The Public Employment Services (PES) are
Regional institutions. They provide various forms of assistance (counseling, various types
of training and other activation measures) to unemployed workers as well as intermediation
services to ﬁrms, and to unemployed and employed workers.
The new monitoring and counseling scheme introduced by the Belgian government in July
2004 induced a major reform within (i) UI and (ii) the assistance for unemployed persons
offered by the Regional PES. We will review these two changes in turn.
2.1 Unemployment Insurance
2.1.1 General Features
On the one hand, the UI system in Belgium is quite generous and unique in the world in that
it entitles unemployed individuals to beneﬁts for an, in principle, unlimited period and also
to school-leavers without any work history after a waiting period of 9 months.4 On the other,
incentives to work are preserved by a relatively low gross replacement rate. In principle, the
replacement rate, as a percentage of gross wage, of a worker with a sufﬁcient employment
record is not higher than 55% or 60%, depending on whether or not the worker cohabits with
3Due to the presence of the institutions of the European Union and other international organizations, there
are many foreigners living in Brussels.
4This waiting period lasts only 6 months for those aged less than 18 years and 12 months for youth between
26 and 30. See www.onem.be for more information.
3a person earning (replacement) labor income. For low-wage workers it may be higher, since
the allowance may not drop below some minimum level depending on the household type,
but it is never higher than 73%.5 The replacement rate is, however, generally lower than
55% or 60%: (i) the level of the allowance is capped if past labor earnings exceed a maxi-
mum (1778e/month in October 2006), so that the replacement rate falls as earnings increase
above this threshold; (ii) the allowance remains indeﬁnitely at the same level only for a head
of a household; for singles and cohabitants the replacement rate drops to respectively 50%
and 40% after a year and three months later the beneﬁt level of cohabitants decreases further
to a ﬂat rate of 405e/month;6 (iii) school-leavers are entitled to ﬂat rate beneﬁts ranging
between 27% and 71% of the federal minimum wage,7 respectively for a cohabitant and a
head of a household. In 2005, roughly one quarter of the claimants were entitled to beneﬁts
as school-leaver. Among these persons 35% were head of household and 44% cohabiting
(RVA, 2006b).
Usually, the average gross replacement rate in Belgium is ranked relatively high in inter-
national statistics. In 2003, e.g., it is reported to be 42% compared to 34%, on average, in
the four neighboring countries (France, Germany, The Netherlands and the UK).8 However,
these ﬁgures are biased since they ignore that in the other countries the unemployed may
be entitled to social assistance after beneﬁts exhaust. If one takes this into account (as well
as the tax system), the average net replacement rate in Belgium is 68%, well below the 73%
average in the neighboring countries.9
2.1.2 Monitoring and sanctions
Before July 2004, the beneﬁts could be withdrawn for two main reasons. First, Article 80
of the UI legislation imposed a ﬁnite entitlement to UI for cohabitants whose household in-
come was not too low (Cockx and Ries, 2004). Depending on the sub-region of residence, the
gender and the age-class, the duration at which exhaustion occurred varied between 24 and
99 months. Since the large majority of cohabitants are women, the scheme has been criticized
for being implicitly discriminatory. This was the main reason why the Belgian government
decided to abolish Article 80 at the same pace as the new monitoring scheme was phased in,
5This rate is attained for a minimum wage worker who is a head of household in charge of dependents
without any (replacement) labor income.
6If the income of the cohabiting person consists of allowances only and does not exceed 712e/month, then
one is entitled to 531e/month.
7In October 2006 this minimum was set at 1,259e/month for someone aged 21 or more and at 1,032e/month
for an 18 year old person. The replacement rate mentioned in the text applies to workers aged 21 years or more.
Note, since in most sectors trade unions have bargained higher minimum wages, only a small fraction of the
workers are paid the federal minimum.
8See www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives (Table on gross replacement rates 1961-2003).
9See www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives (Table on net replacement rates during a 5-year period fol-
lowing unemployment, 2001-2004).
4i.e. gradually according to age-group.
Second, sanctions lead to a temporary or permanent beneﬁt withdrawal. These sanctions
are essentially imposed if the claimant is detected to have made a false declaration (e.g. with
regards the household type or an undeclared employment relationship) or to be unavailable
for the labor market (not registered as a job searcher at the Regional PES, not turning up at a
convocation of this ofﬁce, refusing a "suitable" job offer or refusing participation in an acti-
vation or training program, etc.). Before the reform in 2004, roughly 80% of the monitoring
reports regarding availability concerned not turning up to a convocation (RVA, 2006a, pp.
72).
In Belgium the Regional PES (VDAB in Flanders, FOREM in Wallonia and ORBEM/BGDA
in Brussels) are in charge of verifying whether workers are available for the labor market,
whereas the sanctioning is the competence of the federal Unemployment Agency (UA). Con-
sequently, the effectiveness of monitoring crucially depends on the transmission of informa-
tion from the regional PES to the federal agency. Before 2004, this information transmission
did not occur very systematically and was based on paper ﬁles. Moreover, the Walloon
PES were not very collaborative and transmitted hardly any information, this in contrast to
Flanders and to Brussels.
2.1.3 The reform of the monitoring scheme in 2004
In July 2004, the federal government chose to replace Article 80 with a new, fairer system
which could, at the same time, guarantee the viability of an UI system in which beneﬁts do
not expire. Two main features characterize the new system.
First, the new cooperation agreement reached on April 30, 2004 between the Federal State,
the Communities and the Regions resulted in a much more systematic and electronic exchange
of data with regards the availability for the labor market between the Regional PES and the
federal UA. This exchange is operational since October 2004, but it is only since the second
semester of 2005 that one observes a notable increase in information ﬂows, especially in Wal-
lonia (RVA, 2006a, pp. 72-75).
Second and more importantly, the reform assigns to the federal UA the competence to mon-
itor, within a number of interviews, the effort that claimants devote to job search. Conse-
quently, the capacity of the agency to sanction workers for being unavailable for the labor
market no longer depends exclusively on the information transmitted by the Regional PES.
This monitoring occurs within the so called "procedure for the Activation of Job Search Be-
havior" (AJSB). Within this procedure the federal Unemployment Agency dispatches a no-
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search and labor market availability, and explaining the different steps of the AJSB. This
occurs at an unemployment duration of 7 months for those under the age of 25 and at 13
months for those older than 25 (the "ﬂow"). In addition, individuals who, in July 2004, had
been claiming beneﬁts during more than 7 or 13 months (the "stock") were addressed as well.
Eight months after sending the notiﬁcation letter, the UA starts convoking the unemployed
to a meeting with a caseworker.10 In this meeting the caseworker evaluates, on the basis of
proofs delivered by the unemployed worker (copies of letters of application, registration in
temporary help agencies, proofs of participation to selection procedures, etc.), whether the
claimant has been actively searching for work during the last 12 months. If the outcome of
this evaluation is positive, the worker will not be monitored during the next 16 months. If
not, the worker must sign an action plan and is invited to a new meeting 4 months later.
Sanctions are imposed on workers not showing up without justiﬁcation at the meeting or
not complying with the action plan. These sanctions consist in a temporary or permanent
withdrawal of beneﬁts. In the latter case the worker can regain entitlement only after proof
of a sufﬁcient employment record.11
To cope with capacity problems, the new program was gradually phased in according to
age. In the ﬁrst year, only workers younger than 30 years were contacted and the notiﬁca-
tion of the "stock" was spread out over the year according to age, starting with the youngest
claimants. In the second year, starting in July 2005, the target group was enlarged to those
younger than 40 and, in the third year, those between 40 and 50 years old were included.
Claimants older than 50 are not concerned by the ASJB.
The gradual phasing-in resulted during the ﬁrst years in discontinuous relationships be-
tween the age and the program participation. We exploit these discontinuities to identify
the threat effects induced by the above-mentioned letter of notiﬁcation (see Section 4). How-
ever, it’s important to realize that these discontinuities only apply to the "ﬂow" and not to
the "stock": for the latter group the timing of the treatment evolves gradually with age within
each age-group canceling thereby the potential discontinuity between age groups. This is un-
fortunate, since it reduces the sample size (see Section 3).
10The procedure can be deferred if the claimant participates or has participated in an assistance program of
one of the Regional PES (for further details, see Cockx et al., 2007).
11A worker can regain entitlement to beneﬁts by working at least 312 days, full-time (or part-time), within the
18 (24) months preceding the new application.
62.2 Assistance
The reform in July 2004 did not only reinforce the "stick", it also enhanced the "carrot". In-
deed, theRegionalPESsigniﬁcantlyincreasedtheirassistancetounemployedworkers. Inall
three regions, the supply of counseling and training programs has risen importantly (Cockx
et al., 2007, pp. 26-52). In addition, the reform was seized as an opportunity to move closer
to the recommendations described in the ﬁrst European guideline for employment. This
recommends, on the one hand, a preventive approach aimed at activating all unemployed
persons at an early stage in their period of unemployment and, on the other hand, a curative
approach aimed at systematically directing the long-term unemployed towards appropriate
actions that promote their re-employment. Before 2004, the Walloon and Brussels’ Regional
PES offered a preventive approach to low-skilled youth only. In contrast, the Flemish PES in-
troduced the preventive approach already in 1999 and this for all unemployed job-seekers.
Since 2004, Wallonia and Brussels expanded the preventive approach to adults and all three
Regional PES introduced a curative approach, previously non-existent.
Since 2004, the assistance provided to unemployed workers is structured in a similar way in
the three regions. It starts with an individual intake meeting with a caseworker in which a
mandatory action plan is proposed. The action plan may (but need not) consist in the par-
ticipation in (a sequence of) counseling and/or training programs. Participation in the plan
is mandatory and refusal is notiﬁed to the federal UA that may impose a sanction on this
basis. The curative approach differs from the preventive one in that a collective information
meeting precedes the individual intake.
Regional differences concern the timing of the intervention. We focus on the curative ap-
proach, since this is the one that matters in the empirical analysis. In Wallonia, the unem-
ployed are convoked to the ﬁrst collective information meeting within two months after dis-
patch of the notiﬁcation letter within the above-mentioned AJSB procedure, i.e. after 7 and
13 months of unemployment respectively for individuals younger and older than 25 years.
The new assistance scheme was phased-in according to age-groups at exactly the same pace
as the above-mentioned AJSB procedure. This means that until June 2005 only those below
the age of 30 participated. It implies that the RD design used in this research identiﬁes for
Wallonia not only the impact of the threat effect of the notiﬁcation letter within the ASJB
procedure, but also the participation in the Regional counseling scheme.
In Brussels the unemployed are invited to a collective information session at the same mo-
ment as in Wallonia. However, in contrast to Wallonia, it is announced to participants that
they are convoked to the individual intake with the caseworker after the ﬁrst monitoring
interview within the AJSB procedure. As we will explain more in detail in Section 5, this
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the beneﬁt claimant may temporarily reduce his job-search effort as to beneﬁt from the ac-
tion plan he will be entitled to if he is still unemployed. If so, this should be uncovered in
the empirical analysis, since the phasing-in of the curative approach occurred completely
parallel to that of the new federal monitoring scheme.
Finally, in Flanders, the ﬁrst collective meeting takes place close to the moment at which the
ﬁrst interview within the AJSB procedure takes place, i.e. after 15 and 21 months, respec-
tively for youth aged less than 25 years and older individuals. However, it is only offered to
unemployed workers who did not receive any counseling in the preceding two years. Con-
sequently, it concerns only a small group of workers that for some reasonwas not attained by
the preventive approach. Moreover, since the curative approach was introduced in Flanders
at a faster pace than the ASJB procedure, already in 2004 it concerned workers between the
age of 30 and 40. This means that in Flanders the contrast between workers aged slightly less
and more than 30 years can only reveal the impact of the notiﬁcation within the monitoring
procedure and not the impact of the enhanced counseling.
3 The Data
The analysis is based on monthly administrative reports of the federal UA on beneﬁt claims.
We neither have any information on the assistance provided by the Regional PES nor on the
reason why beneﬁt claims end. Nevertheless, we will argue below that the measured effect
of the notiﬁcation letter on the probability of not being a claimant, reﬂects the effect on the
probability of being employed. We ﬁrst justify the sample selection criteria and the choice
of the observation period. Subsequently, we provide descriptive statistics of the retained
sample. Finally, we discuss the choice of the outcome variables retained in the evaluation.
3.1 Sample selection criteria and choice of the observation period
The empirical analysis exploits the age-discontinuity in the assignment to treatment between
the 1st of July 2004 and the 30th of June 2005: in that period only claimants of UI less than 30
years old were notiﬁed of the AJSB procedure. The fact that individuals older than 30 years
are only temporarily dispensed of treatment complicates the analysis. First, it limits the pe-
riod over which the treatment effect can be measured to maximum one year. This means that
claimants unemployed for more than 13 months on the 1st of July 2004 (the "stock") could
not be retained in the sample: individuals in this group slightly younger than 30 years are
notiﬁed close to the moment at which the slightly older ones are (see Section 2.1). Second,
the unemployed older than 30 could anticipate their treatment within a year. They would
then be invalid controls to the treatment. However, in the robustness analysis below we will
8demonstrate that this anticipation, if it occurs, cannot be very important.
The sample contains claimants of unemployment beneﬁts, who on the 1st of July 2004 were
between 25 and 34 years old and who satisfy all the criteria12 (except for the age, if older
than 30) to be dispatched a notiﬁcation letter between July and October 2004. Since reli-
able data on beneﬁt payments are only available with some delay, the claimant status and
duration criterion (13 months) is determined on the basis of payments made two to three
months before the (theoretical) moment of dispatch of the notiﬁcation. This delay implies
that a number of workers are no longer claiming beneﬁts at the moment that they (should)
receive the notiﬁcation. Since we focus in this research on the threat effect of the letter on
unemployed beneﬁt claimants, we drop these non-claimants from the sample.13
To select the unemployed older than 30 years according to exactly the same rules as the
younger ones, we asked the federal UA to run ex post (in April 2006) the computer program
that identiﬁes the population to be notiﬁed. Nevertheless, since the program is run ex post,
it does not select exactly the same population as the one that would have been if the older
group were to be notiﬁed between July and October 2004: due to administrative mistakes
and to appeals to decisions of beneﬁt withdrawal, some data regarding payments are cor-
rected ex post. In addition, the initial selection program contained some bugs that have been
corrected meanwhile. This problem shows up if we compare the population younger than
30 years that effectively received a notiﬁcation letter in a particular month with the one that
should have according to the ex post simulation. Roughly 15% of the simulated population
are not notiﬁed in the month that they should have been according to the simulation. The
majority is, however, notiﬁed the next month.
To avoid sample selection, we select the population younger than 30 years old in exactly the
same way as the untreated older workers. A consequence of this choice is that the "sharp"
RD design turns into a "fuzzy" one (Hahn et al., 2001): only a fraction (95 % on average)
of the sampled workers below the age of 30 years has effectively been treated. In the next
section we discuss the methodological implications.
In the empirical analysis we estimate the impact of the notiﬁcation on a number of outcome
variables up to eight months after dispatch of the letter. We choose not to extend the analysis
beyond eight months for two reasons. First, the focus of this research is on the threat effect
of the notiﬁcation (possibly combined with counseling). Since from the 9th month onwards,
12Aside from being unemployed more than 13 months, there exist a number of additional criteria that we
ignore for the sake of not overloading the reader with details.
13This reduces the size of the sample by 16% on average, by 12% in Brussels and Wallonia and by 20% in
Flanders. The higher fraction in Flanders reﬂects the better condition of the labor market in that Region.
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Brussels Flanders Wallonia
25-29 years 30-34 years 25-29 years 30-34 years 25-29 years 30-34 years
Number of individuals 758 588 1,341 1,178 1,331 1,082
Month of (potential) notiﬁcation
July 27.0% 27.4% 28.9% 29.4% 28.0% 29.5%
August 25.5% 28.1% 25.1% 23.9% 20.5% 22.2%
October 24.3% 21.6% 22.5% 24.3% 23.5% 25.9%
November 23.2% 23.0% 23.6% 22.5% 28.0% 22.5%
Age
mean age in years on July 1, 2004 27.0 32.0 26.9 32.0 26.8 32.0
(standard deviation) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4)
Sex
women 48.8% 44.1% 52.1% 53.0% 45.9% 46.1%
Nationality
Belgian 75.2% 65.5% 90.2% 86.8% 90.4% 85.5%
EU15 (excluding Belgian) 11.1% 14.0% 2.8% 5.0% 7.3% 10.1%
Others 13.7% 20.6% 6.9% 8.2% 2.3% 4.4%
Schooling level
primary 11.0% 17.0% 14.6% 22.3% 13.8% 20.5%
lower secondary 15.4% 13.8% 19.5% 17.7% 19.3% 21.4%
upper secondary 36.4% 25.5% 45.0% 41.9% 41.5% 35.2%
higher education 21.1% 17.0% 20.8% 17.7% 22.8% 15.0%
other studies 16.1% 26.7% 0.1% 0.3% 2.6% 7.9%
Category of unemployed worker(a)
head of household 22.6% 28.7% 15.0% 23.6% 19.2% 25.8%
single 37.7% 36.9% 24.1% 23.0% 27.4% 23.8%
cohabitant 39.7% 34.4% 60.9% 53.4% 53.3% 50.4%
Type of entitlement to beneﬁts(a)
work experience 79.0% 99.3% 82.6% 98.9% 74.2% 98.0%
school-leaver 21.0% 0.7% 17.5% 1.1% 25.8% 2.0%
Participation in training(a)(b) 5.4% 5.1% 9.3% 8.5% 6.9% 7.3%
Unemployment duration 14.3 14.7 13.7 14.4 13.7 14.5
in months(a)(c)(standard deviation) (5.8) (6.9) (6.4) (7.0) (6.2) (5.9)
Recent UI interruption(a)(d) 32.7% 38.9% 26.9% 33.3% 27.6% 33.1%
Unemployment rate(e)by district 22.3% 22.3% 8.4% 8.3% 22.1% 21.4%
of living (standard deviation) - - (1.8) (1.8) (5.2) (5.4)
(a) At the sample selection date, 2-3 months before the (potential) dispatch of the notiﬁcation.
(b) During the 13 months-period prior to the sample selection date.
(c) According to the Eurostat deﬁnition: counts the number of months that unemployment beneﬁts are claimed counting one
month independently of number of days claimed and setting the duration counter to zero only after an interruption of more
than three months.
(d) This indicator is equal to one if, during the 13 months preceding the sample selection date, one stopped claiming beneﬁts
during more than 1 months, but less than 3 months and zero otherwise.
(e) The number of beneﬁt claimants available for the labor market divided by the number of workers insured against unem-
ployment, by sub-region on June 30, 2004 (ONEM, 2004, p.65).
some notiﬁed individuals pass their ﬁrst interview with the caseworker of the UA, the treat-
ment is no longer homogenous beyond the 8th month. Second, the workers older than 30
who are sampled in October 2004 start to be notiﬁed themselves as from July 2005, i.e. 9
months later. They are therefore no longer a valid control as from that moment.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the sampled population and this separately for the
three Regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels). For each of these Regions, the ﬁrst column
refers to the sample of unemployed workers between 25 and 29 years old and the second
to those aged between 30 and 34. First observe that, in spite of having population data, the
10sampled population is not very large: roughly 2,500 individuals in Flanders and Wallonia
and 1,300 in Brussels. The reason is that we could not include the stock sample of individu-
als with an unemployment duration of more than 13 months (see Sections 3.1 and 2.1). The
sample of the older workers is slightly smaller (2,848) than the younger one (3,430).
For each of the above-mentioned groups Table 1 reports information with respect to a num-
ber of observed characteristics of the unemployed workers: the starting date of the observa-
tion window (July, August, September or October 2004), the age reported in years (but mea-
sured in months) on the 1st of July 2004, the gender, the nationality, the level of education,
the household-type determining the beneﬁt level (head of household, single or cohabitant),
the type of entitlement (school-leaver or work experience), an indicator of participation in
training during the 13-month period prior to the sample selection date, the elapsed unem-
ployment duration according to the Eurostat deﬁnition, an indicator of recent interruption
of UI during more than one and less than three months, the unemployment rate by district
of living. For the continuous variables, we report the average and the standard deviation,
for discrete variables the average proportions. Time-varying variables are evaluated at the
sampling date, i.e. two or three months prior to the (potential) dispatch of the notiﬁcation
letter.
The reader may question why the unemployment duration is not equal to 13 months for
all sampled individuals. The reason is that the unemployment duration as measured ac-
cording to the Eurostat deﬁnition - common in ofﬁcial statistics of unemployment duration
- does not match the one that is used within the AJSB procedure. The latter is obtained by
dividing the number of days that the worker claimed unemployment beneﬁts into 26 and
rounding down to the nearest integer. The duration counter is reset to zero if the worker
has been 12 months full time employed within the preceding 15 months. In contrast, the
Eurostat duration rounds up to the nearest month even if the unemployed worker claimed
beneﬁts during just one day. The duration counter is reset to zero if the worker did not claim
any beneﬁts during three consecutive months.14 Consequently, the Eurostat duration can be
larger or smaller than 13. If it’s smaller than 13 months, the worker must have interrupted
unemployment at least once during more than 3 months (without being full time employed
for more than one year); the larger it is, the less likely such longer interruptions occurred
recently. The Eurostat duration can therefore be considered as a proxy for the employability
of the worker: the smaller it is, the more likely the worker recently had some signiﬁcant15
work experience.
The indicator of recent interruption of UI can be regarded as an additional indicator of labor
14See Cockx et al. (2007, p.19) for more details.
15More than 3 months.
11market attachment. This indicator is equal to one if, during the 13 months preceding the
sample selection date, one stopped claiming beneﬁts during more than 1 month, but less
than 3, and zero otherwise. We add this variable, since it identiﬁes beneﬁt claimants with a
recent labor market experience for whom the Eurostat unemployment duration may be quite
long, since this duration is only reset to zero if the interruption lasts more than 3 months.
The econometric analysis revealed that the inclusion of this indicator is crucial for the anal-
ysis of impact heterogeneity.
On the basis of Table 1 we can deduce that the composition of the populations varies across
both, Regions and age groups. This is not surprising, since the observed characteristics
are often correlated with the region or the age. In Brussels, e.g., the fraction of foreigners
is known to be higher than in the two other regions. Younger workers are in general more
educatedandaremorelikelytobeentitledtobeneﬁtsasaschool-leaver, sincetheprobability
of recently completing education and working is obviously respectively higher and lower
than that for older workers. The correlation of the observed characteristics with age is not
problematic, as long as there is no discontinuity at the age of 30 (see Section 6.3).
3.3 The outcome variables
The benchmark outcome is an indicator variable measured each month between the month
of dispatch of the notiﬁcation and eight months later. It is equal to one if one of the two
following conditions is satisﬁed: within the considered month the worker (i) does not claim
any unemployment beneﬁts or (ii) he claims beneﬁts (at least during one day) while he oc-
cupies a job. It is equal to zero otherwise.
Workers may remain entitled to beneﬁts even if they are employed. The following two situ-
ations are the most common ones:16 (i) Part-time workers in search of full-time employment
are eligible to an income supplement if they earn not too high a wage; (ii) Under certain
conditions hired workers temporarily continue claiming beneﬁts under the form of a wage
subsidy, the so called "work allowance". These two outcomes represent, on average, 11% of
the instances in which the benchmark outcome is equal to one. In Section 6 we will consider
the receipt of an income supplement in part-time jobs as a separate outcome.
The benchmark outcome is not only zero for unemployed workers: a beneﬁt claimant may
under some conditions be temporarily dispensed from job search if he or she participates in
training or in full-time education, or if he or she faces particular social or family problems,
e.g. raising children below the age of four. Neither of these two situations, nor the "work
allowance" is considered as separate outcome in this article. The interested reader is referred
16Other cases are enumerated in Cockx et al. (2007, p.86).
12to Cockx et al. (2007).
As higher mentioned, the benchmark indicator is not only equal to one if one has returned
to work: one can continue search without beneﬁts or withdraw from the labor force. We
argue, however, that, as long as the ﬁrst interview of the AJSB procedure did not take place,
the variation of the benchmark indicator induced by the notiﬁcation letter and by the speciﬁc
assistance provided to the unemployed in Wallonia and Brussels, should reﬂect the causal
effect on employment. Let us brieﬂy explain why. In the period between the notiﬁcation and
the ﬁrst interview, the behavior of claimants is not monitored more intensively.17 There ex-
ists only the threat of monitoring. Consequently, there is no reason to give up beneﬁts in this
period unless the unemployed person can be better off by doing so. It is difﬁcult to imagine
that this would occur in other situations than being offered a higher paying job.
The empirical analysis reported in Cockx et al. (2007) supports this interpretation of the
benchmark indicator. First, we ﬁnd that the treatment did not affect in any Region the num-
ber of sanctions imposed on the unemployed during eight months following the notiﬁca-
tion. This is consistent with the hypothesis that monitoring did not increase before the ﬁrst
interview. Second, during the observation period, we neither ﬁnd any signiﬁcant increase
of exemptions due to social and family reasons, consistent with the hypothesis that there
shouldn’t be any effect on the withdrawal rate from the labor force. In the sequel we there-
fore refer to "employment" as the benchmark outcome.
Critics allege that monitoring schemes may increase employment, but also reduce the qual-
ity of the accepted job offers: workers accept low wage, part-time and unstable employment
to avoid the burden imposed by the monitoring and the risk of a sanction. In Section 6 we try
to obtain more insight in this issue by estimating the impact of the treatment on a number of
additional outcomes. First, we investigate the effect of the notiﬁcation on the stability of the
employment relationship by considering the following two outcome variables: the probabil-
ity of leaving remunerated unemployment during more than 3 and 6 months. Second, we
evaluate whether the treatment affects the transition rate to the higher mentioned low wage
part-time work in which an income supplement is due.
17The Walloon PES convokes the notiﬁed unemployed workers to an intake interview and proposes an in-
dividual action plan, but until the second semester of 2005 (beyond the observation period of the empirical
analysis) the Ofﬁce did not transmit refusals to participate to the federal UA so that no sanction was pending.
We argue in Section 5 that the PES of Brussels may even have signalled to the recipients of the notiﬁcation that
the unemployed are monitored less until the ﬁrst interview.
134 The Econometric Model
Consider Yitc the observed outcome for individual i evaluated t months after dispatch of
the notiﬁcation at calendar time c.18 Y 1
itc and Y 0
itc denote the outcome respectively in case of
notiﬁcation or not. If Ditc denotes the binary treatment indicator equal to one if at calendar
time c individual i has been notiﬁed t months earlier and zero otherwise, then the model of
the observed outcome can be written as follows:
Yitc = ¯tc + ®itcDitc + uitc (1)
where Y 0
itc ´ ¯tc + uitc, ®itc ´ Y 1
itc ¡ Y 0
itc and E(uitc) = 0. Even if the treatment effect is con-
stant in the population (®itc = ¹ ®tc), in general E(uitcjDitc) 6= 0, so that an OLS estimate of
¹ ®tc would be inconsistent. However, since the probability of treatment depends discontinu-
ously on age at 30 years, a two-stage least squares procedure consistently estimates the aver-
age treatment effect locally at that age (Hahn et al., 2001; van der Klaauw, 2002; Wooldridge,
1997).
To see this, ﬁrst recall that we have to do with a fuzzy RD design (cf. Section 3.1), since the as-
signment to treatment is stochastically and discontinuously related to the running variable,
i.e. the age Ai of individual i on the 1st of July 2004:19
E(DitcjA) = P(DitcjA) = ftc(A)1fA < 30g (2)
where 1f:g is the indicator function and ftc(:) is some continuous function of A. If we denote
E(uitcjAi = a) ´ k0tc(a), E(®itcjAi = a) ´ ®tc(a) and [®tc(a) ¡ ®tc(30)]ftc(a) ´ k1tc(a), we
can rewrite the regression equation (1) in the following way:
Yitc = ¯tc + ®tc(30)Ditc + k0tc(Ai) + k1tc(Ai)1fAi < 30g + vitc (3)
wherevitc = [Yitc¡E(YitcjAi)]+®tc(30)[E(DitcjAi)¡Ditc]+[E(®itcDitcjAi)¡®tc(Ai)E(DitcjAi)].
k0tc(Ai)+k1tc(Ai)1fAi < 30g is the control function of age the shape of which differs on both
sides of the discontinuity point (k1tc(Ai) 6= 0) if the average treatment effect varies with age
(®tc(Ai) 6= ®tc(30)).
The two-stage least squares procedure that uses the estimated propensity scores20 deﬁned
18According to the theoretical month of notiﬁcation (July, August, September or October 2004), c can take on
four different values for any given t.
19Note that the RD is only fuzzy to the left of the discontinuity point, since no individual older than 30 years
is treated.
20Note that the propensity score for the group older than 30 years is exactly zero. The propensity score is
therefore estimated on the sub-sample aged less than 30 years.
14in Equation (2) as instruments for the participation indicator in the second stage regression
equation (3) consistently estimates the local average treatment effect ®tc(30) if three condi-
tions are satisﬁed. First, E(vitcjA) = 0 near A = 30. A sufﬁcient requirement for this is21
Assumption 1: E(®itcjA;D) = E(®itcjA) ´ ®tc(A) close to A = 30 (4)
Thisimpliesthatthepersonspeciﬁcimpactofthenotiﬁcation®itc maynotbecorrelatedwith
the treatment Ditc. We argue below that this assumption is likely to hold in this application.
For the two-stage least squares procedure to be consistent, two additional conditions must
be satisﬁed (Hahn et al., 2001):
Assumption 2: k0tc(A) and 3: ®itc(A) are continuous at A = 30 (5)
Intuitively, the continuity of these functions ensures that the discontinuity in the propensity
score in (2) can be viewed as an exclusion restriction, since it ensures that the discontinuity
can affect the outcome only indirectly via the treatment.
The continuity assumptions can be violated if the assignment to other policies is determined
by the same cut off in the running variable. To our knowledge this is not the case. Moreover,
we can check this by testing whether the signiﬁcant treatment impacts at the cut off point
disappear in the year prior to the introduction of the new monitoring scheme (see Section
6.2). Manipulation of the running variable is another reason that can make these functions
discontinuous at the cut off (McCrary, 2007). If the selection rule on the running variable
regarding participation in some program is publicly known, agents may change their be-
havior to qualify for or to avoid participation. This will affect the size and the composition
of the population close to the cut off value of the running variable, which could result in a
discontinuity in the functions reported in Equation (5). We will discuss this possibility in
Section 6.3.
The two-stage least squares procedure provides consistent estimates of the local average
treatment effect only if the functions ftc(:), k0tc(:) and k1tc are correctly speciﬁed. We could
estimate these functions semi-parametrically by local linear regression (Porter, 2003), but
semi-parametric estimation involves a difﬁcult trade-off between bias and precision. More-
over, given the relatively small sample size, a semi-parametric approach cannot much im-
prove on a parametric one. We therefore follow, as Lemieux and Milligan (2006), the lat-
ter approach and perform a sensitivity analysis on ﬁve different speciﬁcations of k0tc(Ai) +
21E(®itcDitcjA) = E[E(®itcjA;D)DitcjA] = E(®itcjA)E(DitcjA) = ®tc(Ai)E(DitcjA), where the ﬁrst equal-
ity follows from the law of iterated expectations and the second from assumption (4). Inserting this result in the
expression for E(vitcjA) yields the desired condition.
15k1tc(Ai)1fAi < 30ginregressionEquation(3). Thespeciﬁcationsincludelinearandquadratic
splines (separate regressions on both sides of the discontinuity) and the standard linear,
quadratic, and cubic functions, assuming that the average treatment effect does not vary
with age, so that ®tc(Ai) = ®tc(30) and therefore k1tc(Ai) = 0. In addition, we also report
for the preferred speciﬁcation the estimated treatment effect obtained from a regression in
which all observed explanatory variables are included as controls and, as a further robust-
ness check (in Section 6), estimates for an increasingly small window around age 30. The
function ftc(:) in (2) is always speciﬁed by a polynomial of the same order as the one chosen
for the regression equation of interest.
Even if the outcome and treatment variables are both binary, we nevertheless specify their
relationship according to a linear probability model. The consistency of the estimator does
not depend on any continuity assumption of the outcome variable (Hahn et al., 2001). Con-
sistency requires, however, a correct speciﬁcation of the propensity score of the treatment,
i.e. of ftc(:). A polynomial linear in the parameters can by deﬁnition not be a correct speci-
ﬁcation. However, since the results are not sensitive to specifying the propensity score as a
probit or a logit,22 this is not a big issue.
The binary nature of the outcome variable renders the error term heteroskedastic. In addi-
tion, evaluating the outcome of the same individual i at different time periods t, induces
serial correlation. We therefore report the cluster-robust standard errors of the two-stage
least squares estimator.23
In order to facilitate interpretation and to improve precision we will test and impose a num-
ber of parameter constraints. In the regression model in Equation (3) all the parameters
depend on t, running from the 3rd to the 8th month after dispatch of the notiﬁcation24 and
on the calendar time c, depending on the timing of the (counterfactual) notiﬁcation. Even
if we always start our estimations from the most general formulation, we never will report
results in which estimated treatment effects depend on c, since these restrictions can never
be rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level. In addition, since we can neither reject independence
of t (between the 3rd and 8th month after dispatch of the notiﬁcation letter), the evolution of
the treatment effect is just reported graphically in Figure 1.
22These results are not reported, but can be obtained from the authors on request.
23In principle we should also adjust the standard errors to allow for the speciﬁcation error induced by the
grouping of age in monthly intervals (Lee and Card, 2006). However, since a robustness check in which we
estimated the effect in one time period only revealed that standard errors are hardly affected when we allow for
clustering within age-groups, we ignore the grouping over age.
24We do not consider the months prior to the 3
rd month after dispatch of the notiﬁcation, since this would
complicate the presentation of the results without adding fundamental insights: the restriction that the treatment
effect is constant over calendar time c is rejected during this initial period.
16In order to verify whether the treatment affects particular subgroups more than others, we
also consider a model in which the treatment indicator Ditc is interacted with the observed
characteristics of the unemployed workers. However, since the sample size is relatively
small, we should sensibly restrict the number of interaction terms. We do this by ﬁrst esti-
mating for each Region a model with all interactions. Subsequently, we drop all interaction
terms that are not (jointly) signiﬁcant at the 10% signiﬁcance level in any of the three Re-
gions. This means that for some Regions insigniﬁcant terms may be retained as long as they
are signiﬁcant in one of the two other Regions. This ensures us a uniform presentation across
Regions.
The model with interaction effects no longer identiﬁes the local average treatment effect
non-parametrically, since this would require to allow all the control functions in age to vary
freely with every possible value of the characteristics retained in the interaction terms. This
is clearly not feasible. To avoid that our inference is completely driven by the implicit para-
metric assumptions, we propose a procedure on the basis of which we can gauge whether
these assumptions make sense.
The procedure consists ﬁrst in predicting, on the basis of an interaction model, the treatment
effect, constant over t and c, for each sampled individual, treated or not. We then consti-
tute sub-samples on the basis of particular percentiles of the distribution of the predicted
treatment effects - we chose the 30% and the 70% percentile - and re-estimate on this sample
the local average treatment effect using the model without interactions. The test consists in
comparing on these sub-samples the last mentioned estimate of the treatment effect to the
one obtained on the basis of the interaction model. If the interaction model is well speciﬁed
these two estimates should be close.25
5 The Results of the Benchmark Model and their Interpretation
5.1 What Does Theory Predict?
Jobsearchtheory(seee.g.Mortensen,1986;vandenBerg,1990)predictsthatbeneﬁtclaimants
will modify their job-search intensity and acceptance behavior from the moment that they
are informed of a future event that affects their welfare. Consequently, to avoid a sudden
drop in their welfare induced by an intensiﬁed monitoring of job-search behavior, claimants
should, from the moment of notiﬁcation, accelerate their transition from unemployment to
work (see Appendix). The empirical ﬁndings reported below for Flanders - where the no-
tiﬁed group did not receive any speciﬁc counseling or assistance - match this prediction,
25 Following this procedure, we detected a speciﬁcation problem if we did not interact the treatment indicator
with the indicator variable "recent interruption of UI".
17but only for the higher educated workers. For the lower educated workers, no signiﬁcant
impact is detected of the notiﬁcation on the employment probability, presumably by lack of
job opportunities for the lower skilled or because the lower educated require counseling to
improve their job search effectiveness.
Counseling can enhance, cancel or even reverse the threat effect of the notiﬁcation, depend-
ing on the moment it takes place. In Wallonia, the French speaking region in the south of
Belgium, the unemployed workers are invited within two months of the notiﬁcation for a
collective information session. Subsequently, a caseworker of the Regional Employment Of-
ﬁce counsels them personally on their job search strategy. If necessary, this is followed-up
with further counseling and with participation in various types of training. Since counseling
increases the effectiveness of job search, we expect it to reinforce the threat effect of the no-
tiﬁcation (see Appendix). We indeed ﬁnd that in this Region the probability of employment
is not only enhanced for the higher educated workers, but also for women and for workers
with a recent work experience.
In Brussels the notiﬁed workers were also convoked to a collective information session
within two months after the receipt of the letter. However, these workers were informed
that they would be counseled only shortly after the monitoring interview that takes place
roughly 8 months after dispatch of the notiﬁcation letter.26 Announcing a start-up of the
counseling at a later date may, however, be counterproductive and cancel or even reverse
the threat effect. For, if counseling raises the effectiveness of job search, this will not only
allow the worker to fulﬁll more easily the job search requirements imposed by the monitor-
ing, but it will also raise the value of being unemployed. Now if the future option value
of unemployment is enhanced, this decreases the incentive of the worker to search for a job
today (see Appendix). Whether this occurs depends on the perceived effectiveness of the
offered counseling and on the stringency of the search requirements: for some workers the
threat effect of the monitoring may still dominate. The ﬁndings reported for Brussels are
consistent with this story: the employment probabilities after dispatch of the notiﬁcation
are signiﬁcantly lower than those of the control group except for women and singles. They
demonstrate that it is crucial, in the design of a monitoring program, to accommodate the
timing of the accompanying counseling program.
26The Brussels’ Employment Ofﬁce coped with capacity problems, because it decided to invite since Febru-
ary 2004 all workers below the age of 50 and before being unemployed for longer than 3 months to an intake
interview in which an individual action plan is started up.
18Table 2: Local Average Treatment Effects on the Probability of Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Region Brussels
Outcome without treatment(a) 0.227
(standard error) (0.023)
®(30) -0.076 -0.077 -0.033 -0.034 -0.034 -0.065 -0.046
(standard error) (0.070) (0.069) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.060) (0.044)
Polynomial order 2 2 1 1 2 3 1
Spline Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Polynomial speciﬁc by t and c Yes No No No No No No
Control variables No No No No No No Yes
Number of observations 8076
Number of individuals 1346
Flanders
Outcome without treatment(a) 0.291
(standard error) (0.017)
®(30) 0.063 0.062 0.034 0.036 0.034 0.052 0.041
(standard error) (0.053) (0.053) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.047) (0.034)
Polynomial order 2 2 1 1 2 3 1
Spline Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Polynomial speciﬁc by t and c Yes No No No No No No
Control variables No No No No No No Yes
Number of observations 15114
Number of individuals 2519
Wallonia
Outcome without treatment(a) 0.222
(standard error) (0.016)
®(30) 0.040 0.039 0.034 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.042
(standard error) (0.047) (0.047) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.042) (0.031)
Polynomial order 2 2 1 1 2 3 1
Spline Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Polynomial speciﬁc by t and c Yes No No No No No No
Control variables No No No No No No Yes
Number of observations 14478
Number of individuals 2413
(a) This is the estimated average employment probability of a non-treated claimant aged 30 in the
regression model of column (4). This probability is hardly sensitive to the estimated model so that
we only report it for one model.
5.2 The Local Average Treatment Effect on the Employment Probability
Table 2 reports the local average impact of the notiﬁcation between 3 to 8 months after the
moment of dispatch on the probability of employment as deﬁned in Section 3.3. The estima-
tions are based on observations in a window of ﬁve years above and below the discontinuity
point at 30 years. Section 6.1 analyzes whether the results are sensitive to the width of this
observation window. The number of observations is the number of individuals multiplied
by the 6 observation months, i.e. 3 to 8 months after dispatch of the notiﬁcation. In Wallo-
nia the estimates are very stable across the different speciﬁcations. In the other two Regions
they are roughly double as large in absolute value in the more ﬂexible speciﬁcations, but
this sensitivity is negligible given the precision of the estimates. Even if the average im-
pacts are never signiﬁcantly different from zero, it is interesting to note that, if we take our
19Table 3: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on the Probability of Employment
Panel A Brussels Flanders Wallonia
Parameter Estimates(a)
Reference -0.107 0.003 0.049
(standard error) (0.070) (0.054) (0.056)
Women 0.124*** 0.027 0.078**
(standard error) (0.043) (0.035) (0.033)
Higher education -0.027 0.116** 0.067
(standard error) (0.062) (0.048) (0.048)
Living alone 0.138*** 0.028 0.028
(standard error) (0.046) (0.039) (0.037)
Unemployment duration -0.002 -0.002 -0.007**
(standard error) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Recent UI interruption -0.003 0.067* 0.104***
(standard error) (0.043) (0.035) (0.034)
Number of observations 8076 15114 14478
Number of individuals 1346 2519 2413
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Treatment Effects
"Parametric" effect(b) -0.144*** -0.037 0.044 -0.012 0.045 0.115*** -0.048 0.040 0.123***
(standard error) (0.051) (0.043) (0.053) (0.041) (0.035) (0.043) (0.038) (0.032) (0.038)
"Non-parametric" effect(c) -0.210** -0.046 0.059 0.010 0.041 0.085 -0.016 0.042 0.112*
(standard error) (0.082) (0.044) (0.081) (0.067) (0.034) (0.066) (0.055) (0.031) (0.057)
Outcome without treatment 0.295 0.228 0.177 0.318 0.287 0.275 0.230 0.220 0.216
(standard error) (0.030) (0.022) (0.028) (0.021) (0.017) (0.023) (0.021) (0.016) (0.022)
Panel C (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Descriptive Statistics
Women 2.7% 46.7% 52.8% 31.7% 52.5% 62.4% 16.8% 46.0% 74.1%
Higher education 16.6% 19.3% 15.0% 0.0% 19.4% 62.2% 2.2% 19.3% 43.5%
Living alone 1.0% 37.4% 85.9% 11.2% 23.6% 33.6% 31.3% 25.8% 31.1%
Unemployment duration 14.8 13.5 11.5 15.9 13.1 13.1 16.4 13.1 11.0
Recent UI interruption 41.3% 35.4% 29.4% 0.0% 29.9% 51.9% 0.3% 30.0% 57.1%
Number of individuals 404 1346 453 706 2519 776 721 2413 750
(1) Sub-sample of the 30% lowest treatment effects.
(2) Total sample of (potentially) notiﬁed UI claimants aged 25-34 years.
(3) Sub-sample of the 30% highest treatment effects.
(a) Estimated with a linear polynomial in age.
(b) Local average treatment effect for a claimant aged 30 deduced from a model with treatment interactions.
(c) Local average treatment effect for a claimant aged 30 deduced from a model without treatment interactions. The "non-
parametric" effects reported in columns (2) correspond to the ones in column (7) of Table 2.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
preferred estimate reported in the last column,27 the point estimates suggest that the notiﬁ-
cation increases the employment probability by roughly four percentage points in Flanders
and Wallonia, whereas it decreases the employment probability by roughly ﬁve percentage
points in Brussels. This reﬂects the different way in which the Regional PES have accommo-
dated to the reform of the monitoring scheme. In Wallonia the threat effect of the notiﬁcation
is as large as in Flanders even if its unemployment rate is double as high as in in Flanders.
We argue that this is due to the speciﬁc assistance, absent in Flanders, that the Walloon PES
provides to the target group. The negative impact in Brussels is consistent with the inappro-
priate timing of the counseling, as discussed in the theoretical model.
205.3 Heterogenous Treatment Effects
The fact that the average treatment effects are not signiﬁcantly different from zero is partly
explained by the lack of precision of our estimates resulting from the small sample size. An-
other explanation is that the average conceals heterogeneity of the treatment effect. We in-
deed ﬁnd that the policy reform does affect the employment probability of particular groups,
while it does not of others or it does so negatively.
Table 3 contains the results of the model with treatment interactions. Panel A reports the
retained interaction coefﬁcients. In panel B one can ﬁnd the corresponding local average
treatment effects for three samples: (1) the sub-sample of the 30% lowest treatment effects
(calculated on the basis of the model with treatment interactions); (2) the total sample of (po-
tentially) notiﬁed UI claimants aged 25-35 years; (3) the sub-sample of the 30% highest treat-
ment effects. Estimates are reported for the models with and without treatment interaction
terms. We denote the former as the "parametric" treatment effect, since it implicitly assumes
a parametric form for the interaction terms of the treatment and of the (linear) polynomial
in age. The latter is "non-parametric" in that it does not include interaction terms. Since the
parameter estimates obtained with these two methods are always very close, we can conﬁ-
dently rely on the results from the parametric speciﬁcation. Finally, panel C contains for the
three (sub-)samples descriptive statistics of the retained interaction variables. This enables
to compare the composition of the sub-samples of the 30% lowest and highest effects in, re-
spectively column (1) and (3), with that of the full sample in column (2).
In Flanders we measure the "pure" threat effect of the notiﬁcation, since the Regional PES
did not provide any speciﬁc assistance to the target group. The treatment effect is only sig-
niﬁcant for high educated claimants (and also for those with a recent interruption of the UI
spell, but less so). The employment probability of the group with the 30% highest treatment
effects increases with 11.5% (column (3), Panel B), from 27.5% to 39%. For the other groups,
reported in columns (1) and (2), no signiﬁcant effects are detected.
In Wallonia the target group receives speciﬁc counseling and training. Despite the much
higher unemployment rate in this Region, the additional assistance enhances employment
for a wider group of beneﬁt claimants: not only for highly educated workers, but also for
women and for claimants with a recent employment experience (short unemployment du-
ration and recent UI interruption). The employment probability of the group with the 30%
highest effects increases on average by 12.3%. In contrast with that of other groups, this ef-
27We prefer this speciﬁcation, since higher order terms of the polynomial in age or the separate polynomials on
both sides of the discontinuity point (splines) are never signiﬁcant at the 5% level of signiﬁcance and including
controls increases (slightly) the precision.
21Figure 1: The Time-Proﬁle of the Effect for Claimants with the 30% Highest (Flanders and
Wallonia) and Lowest (Brussels) Effects
fect is signiﬁcantly different from zero.
In Brussels the PES counteracts the threat effect of monitoring by announcing to the re-
cipients of the notiﬁcation letter that they will be counseled roughly at the same moment
at which their search behavior will be monitored. This is especially the case for men and
claimants living with other adults or with children (and who are therefore not single): these
groups are over-represented within the group with the 30% lowest effects. On average the
employment probability of the latter group is 14.4% lower than in the absence of policy re-
form. Even if the effect is very imprecisely estimated, it’s signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Up to this point we always reported the average of the treatment effect between the 3rd and
the 8th month after notiﬁcation, since a constant treatment effect could not be rejected statis-
tically. The theoretical model in the Appendix predicts, however, that the job search intensity
should, as one approaches the monitoring interview, monotonically increase in Flanders and
Wallonia, and decrease in Brussels. This should result in an increasing proﬁle of employ-
ment probability over the observation period.28 Figure 1, reporting the time-proﬁle of the
treatment effect for the 30% highest (Flanders and Wallonia) and lowest (Brussels) effects, is
consistent with this prediction of the theoretical model.
28If the transition rate from employment is not negatively affected, this should even increase the employment
probability at an increasing rate. However, our estimates are not precise enough to test this prediction.
22Table 4: RD-Estimates with Different Age Windows
DS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# obs. # indiv.
Brussels
§1 year 1458 243 -0.062 -0.082 -0.083 -0.120
(0.051) (0.049) (0.108) (0.098)
§2 years 3186 531 0.005 -0.003 -0.099 -0.111*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.072) (0.067)
§3 years 4866 811 0.021 0.012 -0.075 -0.090
(0.028) (0.028) (0.058) (0.055)
§4 years 6534 1089 0.018 0.010 -0.034 -0.046
(0.024) (0.024) (0.050) (0.048)
§5 years 8076 1346 0.030 0.016 -0.034 -0.046
(0.021) (0.022) (0.045) (0.044)
Flanders
§1 year 2922 487 0.070* 0.076** 0.105 0.119
(0.038) (0.038) (0.078) (0.076)
§2 years 5664 944 0.045 0.051* 0.128** 0.135**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.055) (0.054)
§3 years 8604 1434 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.041 0.051
(0.023) (0.022) (0.046) (0.045)
§4 years 11874 1979 0.105*** 0.099*** 0.026 0.036
(0.019) (0.019) (0.039) (0.038)
§5 years 15114 2519 0.115*** 0.109*** 0.036 0.041
(0.017) (0.017) (0.035) (0.034)
Wallonia
§1 year 2676 446 0.043 0.059* 0.091 0.148**
(0.036) (0.035) (0.071) (0.067)
§2 years 5556 926 0.058** 0.055** 0.034 0.047
(0.026) (0.026) (0.050) (0.048)
§3 years 8274 1379 0.071*** 0.068*** 0.033 0.049
(0.021) (0.021) (0.041) (0.040)
§4 years 11316 1886 0.082*** 0.071*** 0.029 0.039
(0.018) (0.018) (0.036) (0.035)
§5 years 14478 2413 0.092*** 0.078*** 0.036 0.042
(0.016) (0.016) (0.033) (0.031)
Controls :
Age (linear) No No Yes Yes
Other No Yes No Yes
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
6 Robustness Checks and Extensions
6.1 Narrowing the Window of the Running Variable, Age
The discontinuity approach is arguably more convincing the closer the observations to the
discontinuity point. However, there is a trade-off between bias and precision. For a narrow
observation window the bias introduced by not or incorrectly controlling for age is smaller,
but this comes at a cost of precision, since the number of observations is relatively smaller.
In Table 4 we report the local average treatment effect for sub-samples selected within an
increasingly narrow age window around the discontinuity point at 30 years. The disconti-
nuity sample §1 (abbreviated as DS §1) consists of the treatment group of 29-year-olds and
the control group of 30-year-olds; DS §2 includes the 28- and 29-year-olds in the treatment
23group and the 30- and 31-year-olds in the control group. DS §3, DS §4 and DS §5 are de-
ﬁned similarly. Columns (1) and (2) state, respectively, the total number of individuals and
observations. For each sample we report the results for four different speciﬁcations. The
speciﬁcations underlying columns (5) and (6) contain a linear term in age, whereas those of
columns (3) and (4) do not. The results reported in columns (4) and (6) differ from those
reported in columns (3) and (5) in that they include all explanatory variables mentioned in
Table 1 as additional control variables.
The results conﬁrm that the ﬁndings are not sensitive to including or not the non-age control
variables in the regression equation and that that the precision is in general only mildly in-
creased. For the sub-samples close to the discontinuity point the estimated treatment effects
of the models ignoring the control for age are similar to the ones constructed from a wider
age-window (DS §4 and DS §5) for which the age controls are included. This is reassuring,
since the narrower the age window, the less important it is to control for differences in age.
The fact that the estimates in columns (3) and (4) deviate from those in columns (5) and (6)
is quite intuitive for the wide age windows, since age differences become more important.
However, for the narrower age windows (DS §1 and DS §2), the estimates with the control
functions in age are also systematically larger in absolute value, except for the DS §2 in
Wallonia. We put forward two explanations. First, the standard errors of the effects are also
much larger, so that the smaller point estimates are always enclosed by the 95% conﬁdence
interval. Second, the linear polynomial in age was the preferred one for the widest age
window. There is no reason why it should be for narrower age windows.
6.2 Falsiﬁcation Test in the Year Prior to the Reform
We mentioned in Section 4 that the continuity assumption can be violated if the assignment
to other policies is determined by the same cut off in the running variable. We check this by
repeating the RD analysis on a sample of beneﬁt claimants aged between 25 and 34 in 2003 to
whom the federal UA would have dispatched a notiﬁcation if the new monitoring scheme
had been put into force for this age group already in 2003. Table 5 reports our ﬁndings.
The local average treatment effects at 30 are never signiﬁcantly different from zero. They
are extremely small in Flanders and in Wallonia, and slightly positive in Brussels. This is
reassuring. However, even if in 2004 these effects were larger in absolute value, they were
never signiﬁcant. We therefore checked whether the effects remain insigniﬁcant for the same
sub-populations for which we reported signiﬁcant treatment effects in 2004. We conﬁrm that
this is the case.29
29These results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
24Table 5: Falsiﬁcation Test: RD-Estimatesy in the Year Prior
to the Reform, 2003
Brussels Flanders Wallonia
2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003
®(30) -0.046 0.025 0.041 0.001 0.042 -0.005
(standard error) (0.044) (0.037) (0.034) (0.030) (0.031) (0.027)
# obs. 8076 7926 15114 15252 14478 15114
# indiv. 1346 1321 2519 2542 2413 2519
y Speciﬁcation with linear polynomial in age and control variables.
6.3 Testing for Manipulation of the Running Variable
The RD approach is only valid to the extent that the intended treatment population cannot
change it’s behavior - "manipulate the running variable" - as to avoid (or to beneﬁt from)
the treatment. In this study the running variable, age, can not be manipulated directly, but
can be indirectly since assignment to the treatment is not solely based on age, but also on
being a beneﬁt claimant for 13 months or more (if one is older than 25). This unemployment
duration can be manipulated if the unemployed workers anticipate the dispatch of the no-
tiﬁcation and leave unemployment even before receiving the notiﬁcation or postpone this
transition.30 This would reduce, respectively increase, the size of the treated population and
change its composition.31
We test whether manipulation of the running variable is an issue in three ways. First, since
the sample is selected two to three months before dispatch of the notiﬁcation (cf. Section
3.1), we can verify whether the workers below the age of 30 years already have a higher em-
ployment probability than the older group before the treatment, i.e. the moment at which
the notiﬁcation is dispatched. Second, we apply the McCrary’s test on the continuity of the
density of the running variable.32 Thirdly, in order to test for composition effects, we test
whether the predetermined characteristics (reported in Table 1) are smooth around the cut-
off age. Table 6 reports the local average treatment effect on the probability of employment
one to two months before dispatch of the notiﬁcation. The point estimates are very close
to zero and never signiﬁcant. We obtain similar ﬁndings if we focus on the sub-groups for
which we detected signiﬁcant treatment effects after dispatch of the notiﬁcation.33
Figure 2 reports for each Region the number of sampled beneﬁt recipients by age (expressed
30If the treatment is not perceived as a threat, but as a beneﬁt - as it may be for a number of claimants in
Brussels - the transition from unemployment may be postponed instead of accelerated.
31More educated workers, e.g., have more opportunities to leave unemployment as a result of the threat then
less educated ones.
32We can only approximate this density, since we cannot observe the size of the total population at a particular
age as measured on July 1, 2004. However, as long as this size does not vary discontinuously with age this
shouldn’t matter for the test.
33These results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
25Table 6: Anticipation Effects 1 to 2 Months Before the
Month of (Potential) Notiﬁcationy
Brussels Flanders Wallonia
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
®(30) 0.003 0.001 -0.025 -0.023 0.002 0.008
(standard error) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
# obs. 4572 4572 9423 9423 8478 8478
# indiv. 1524 1524 3141 3141 2826 2826
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
y Speciﬁcation with linear polynomial in age.
in months) around the point of discontinuity at 360 months (= 30 years). We cannot discern
any discontinuity. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed in a formal regression analysis, reported in the
ﬁrst line of Table A-1 in the Appendix. This table also reports the local average treatment ef-
fects for all the predetermined variables reported in Table 1. Apart from the variables "men"
and "lower secondary education" in Flanders and "cohabitant" in Wallonia, none of the point
estimates are signiﬁcantly different from zero at a P-level of 10%. We are therefore conﬁdent
that the smoothness assumption is satisﬁed and that the composition is not affected prior to
the sampling date.
6.4 Testing for Substitution Effects
In the RD analysis we implicitly assume that the members of the control group are not af-
fected by the treatment and that the members of the treatment group are only affected by
their own treatment and not by the treatment of others: it is assumed that external treatment
effects are absent. This assumption is violated if the notiﬁcation and the speciﬁc counsel-
ing induces substitution. For instance, it is possible that notiﬁed (and/or counseled) beneﬁt
claimants are hired at the expense of the non-notiﬁed ones. If so, the estimates of the local
average treatment effect on the basis of the RD analysis is biased upwards, since part of the
difference between the treated and the controls is induced by the lower employment rate of
the controls. The treatment effect can also be downward biased. For instance, it is possible
that beneﬁt recipients older than 30 years in Wallonia have also beneﬁted from the enhanced
supply of counseling and training.
To test for the presence of substitution effects, we follow Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) by
assuming that beneﬁt recipients who are at least 10 years older than the treated population
are not affected by the policy reform. In addition, we assume that, in the absence of the pol-
icy reform, the proﬁle of the employment probability with age for the group aged between
30 and 34 would have undergone a parallel shift between 2003 and 2004 of the same size as
the one observed for the group aged between 39 and 43 years, at least 10 years older than
the the treated population aged between 25 and 29.34 With these assumptions the external
34This corresponds to Assumptions 1c and 2c in Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004).
26Figure 2: Testing the Continuity of the Running Variable: The Number of Individuals by Age
(in Months)
treatment effect of the threat of monitoring (possibly combined with intensiﬁed counseling)
can be estimated by a difference-in-differences (DID) estimator. The assumption that the
shift in the age-employment proﬁle of the claimants aged between 30 and 34 corresponds to
the one observed among the 39-43-year-olds can be challenged: Economic conditions were
improving between 2003 and 2004 and the hiring rate of the young is generally more sensi-
tive to the business cycle than of the older workers. The estimates of the substitution effects
should therefore be considered as an upper bound. In Table 7 we report these DID estimates
for an increasingly wide age window of untreated beneﬁt recipients: We ﬁrst consider the
external treatment effect on the 30-year-olds, subsequently on the 30-31-year-olds, and so
on, widening the interval each time by one year until we attain the 30-34 year age group.
If substitution effects decrease with age, the estimates should decelerate towards zero the
wider is the interval. On the other hand, the sensitivity of the age-employment proﬁle to the
business cycle should be less biased upwards the wider the age interval.
The reported point estimates are never signiﬁcantly different from zero. In Brussels and
Wallonia they are nearly all positive and more so the wider is the age interval. For these
wider intervals we expect the upward bias to be the smallest. As a consequence, substi-
tution is unlikely to be important in these Regions and if any it might rather be positive.
On the other hand in Flanders the substitution effect is mostly negative, especially for the
wider age-intervals. Consequently, should the threat of monitoring induce any employment
27Table 7: Substitution Effects on the Older
Beneﬁt Claimantsy
Age group Brussels Flanders Wallonia
30 0.012 -0.025 -0.015
(standard error) (0.052) (0.037) (0.036)
# obs. 5718 15078 11934
# indiv. 953 2513 1989
30-31 0.004 0.003 0.019
(standard error) (0.038) (0.029) (0.027)
# obs. 7290 17646 14604
# indiv. 1215 2941 2434
30-32 0.029 -0.004 0.013
(standard error) (0.033) (0.025) (0.024)
# obs. 8742 20478 17220
# indiv. 1457 3413 2870
30-33 0.031 -0.026 0.022
(standard error) (0.031) (0.023) (0.022)
# obs. 10194 23724 19638
# indiv. 1699 3954 3273
30-34 0.027 -0.031 0.022
(standard error) (0.029) (0.022) (0.021)
# obs. 11442 26556 22014
# indiv. 1907 4426 3669
y DID estimates with the 39-43 age-group as controls.
of younger workers at the expense of older workers, this is most likely to happen in Flan-
ders. On the other hand, the labor market is much tighter in Flanders than in the two other
Regions. Theoretically we expect therefore less substitution in Flanders.
Finally, one could argue that the substitution effects are likely to be more important for the
sub-groups for whom we found the highest treatment effects. We therefore veriﬁed whether
the substitution effects for these groups are signiﬁcantly different from zero.35 We retain for
this analysis only the widest age window, i.e. the 30-34-year-olds. From this analysis we did
not ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects for any of the sub-groups and Regions. We therefore conclude
that if any substitution occurred, it cannot have been important.
6.5 The Quality of Employment
The threat of monitoring enhances the employment probability of high educated workers
and, ifitiscombinedwithintensiﬁedcounselingandtraining, otherspeciﬁcgroups(women,
unemployed people with recent work experience) may also beneﬁt. One may, however, be
concerned whether the higher likelihood of employment does not come at the expense of the
quality of the job. We provide some partial evidence on the basis of the limited number in-
dicators that are available: the probability of being employed for more than 3 or 6 months36
35The estimation results may be obtained from the authors upon request.
36As a consequence of the limited observation period, we can only observe this outcome for individuals who
are employed not later than, respectively, the 7
th and the 4
th month after dispatch of the notiﬁcation.
28Table 8: The Impact on the Quality of Employmenty
Employed > 3 months Employed > 6 months Low-wage part-time job
Impacts Brussels Flanders Wallonia Brussels Flanders Wallonia Brussels Flanders Wallonia
Reference -0.087 0.009 0.044 -0.065 0.036 0.053 -0.015 0.002 -0.001
(s.e.)z (0.065) (0.053) (0.054) (0.060) (0.050) (0.051) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017)
Women 0.088** 0.021 0.051 0.048 0.024 0.027 0.015 0.001 -0.003
(s.e.) (0.041) (0.034) (0.032) (0.038) (0.032) (0.030) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
H. educ. -0.027 0.136*** 0.066 -0.054 0.117** 0.066 0.006 0.032** 0.000
(s.e.)z (0.060) (0.048) (0.047) (0.058) (0.047) (0.045) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
Single 0.112** 0.046 0.024 0.055 0.040 0.018 0.029* 0.016 -0.016
(s.e.)z (0.044) (0.037) (0.035) (0.041) (0.034) (0.033) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Duration -0.002 -0.002 -0.008*** 0.003 -0.004 -0.007** -0.000 0.001 -0.000
(s.e.)z (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Interrupt. -0.015 0.050 0.099*** -0.048 0.043 0.074** 0.001 -0.008 0.019*
(s.e.)z (0.040) (0.034) (0.033) (0.038) (0.032) (0.031) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011)
Outcome without treatment
0.175 0.207 0.174 0.114 0.138 0.121 0.016 0.013 0.018
(s.e.)z (0.021) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
# obs. 6730 12595 12065 2692 5038 4826 8076 15114 14478
# indiv. 1346 2519 2413 1346 2519 2413 1346 2519 2413
y Model with treatment interactions and a linear polynomial in age.
z s.e. = standard error
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
and the probability of being employed in a part-time low-wage job in which an income sup-
plement is due (see Section 3.3). In order to focus on the effects of speciﬁc groups, we present
only the model with interaction effects.
Table 8 reports our ﬁndings. First, we ﬁnd mixed evidence in Flanders. On the one hand,
the threat effect induces the high educated workers to enter more stable jobs, since the prob-
ability of being employed for more than 3 and 6 months is about as much enhanced as the
benchmark indicator. This may follow from the fact that the threat of monitoring only dis-
appears if the worker has been full-time employed for more than 12 months.37 On the other
hand, the probability of part-time employment with income supplement is also higher. This
suggeststhatthethreatofmonitoringmayindeedleadtoacceptinglowerqualityjobs. How-
ever, further research is needed to conﬁrm this ﬁnding.
In Wallonia the employment in low-wage part-time jobs is not stimulated. This can be a con-
sequence of the counseling: the case workers may want to preclude that workers are pushed
in lower quality jobs. On the other hand, despite the counseling, the program enhances em-
ployment in unstable jobs for women: the effect on the probability of being employed more
than 3 or 6 months is no longer signiﬁcantly different from zero. This may result from the
rapid development of subsidized domestic assistance jobs since 2004 in Wallonia. These jobs
37See the discussion on the deﬁnition of unemployment duration used within the AJSB procedure in Section
3.2.
29are predominantly ﬁlled by women and characterized by short-term contracts.
Finally, in Brussels no signiﬁcant impact is observed on the probability of being employed
in the part-time job with income supplement. More importantly, the likelihood of being
employed more than 6 months is now no longer signiﬁcantly negatively affected any group.
This is consistent with the theory: It does not make sense to reject job offers with long-term
employment prospects as to beneﬁt from the counseling services offered later on.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we estimated the threat effect of intensiﬁed monitoring for unemployment ben-
eﬁt claimants close to 30 years old. We ﬁnd that the pure threat effect only increases the prob-
ability of employment of the high educated workers and increasingly so as one approaches
the moment at which the monitoring takes place. Since the threat of monitoring remains if
one reverts to unemployment within a year, the threat does not seem to enhance employ-
ment in unstable jobs. However, the threat of monitoring seems to come at the expense of
accepting lower quality jobs: the notiﬁcation that monitoring will take place induces high
educated beneﬁt claimants to more easily accept part-time low-wage jobs.
The appropriate timing of the counseling is essential for the policy to be effective. If the ben-
eﬁt claimants are counseled brieﬂy after being notiﬁed that a monitoring interview will take
place within eight months, this favors employment for a larger group, in particular for the
workers with a recent employment experience and for women. For women this policy only
increases the transition to unstable jobs, not to stable ones. If the counseling is announced to
take place shortly after the monitoring interview, claimants more reluctantly accept tempo-
rary jobs as to beneﬁt from the assistance provided later on.
We conclude that this article has shown that, even if the literature suggests that monitoring
itself does not increase the probability of employment, the threat of it (possibly combined
with simultaneous counseling) can enhance it, be it for a group of more employable workers
and less so for the more disadvantaged. Moreover, we found some indication that the pure
threat effect of monitoring induces workers to accept jobs of lower quality, but that this
negative effect can be undone by providing appropriate counseling. We must keep in mind,
however, that these effects were measured right after the introduction of the policy reform.
Threat effects may then have been of a different magnitude than currently, since claimants
were uncertain at that time how harsh the monitoring would be.
30Appendix
In this Appendix we present a simple model that allows us to predict the effect of notifying a claimant
that a monitoring interview will take place at later date on the evolution of the job-search effort prior
to that date. We consider four cases:
1. The benchmark model without monitoring;
2. The impact of notifying the monitoring;
3. The impact of simultaneously counseling notiﬁed claimants;
4. The impact of announcing that both monitoring and counseling will take place at some future
date.
The ﬁrst model describes the behavior before the 2004 reform has taken place. The three subsequent
ones aim at capturing a stylized form of the reforms, respectively in Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels.
A-1 The benchmark model without monitoring
Consider an unemployed worker claiming beneﬁts b. Assume that claimants accept any proposed job
offers38 and that the job arrival rate is proportional to the job search effort s: ¸(s) = ¸s. Furthermore,
assuming that the worker is risk-neutral, z denotes the instantaneous utility of claiming unemploy-
ment beneﬁts, including the value of domestic production and, possibly, undeclared labor income
(z > b). The cost arising from search effort is c(s), where c(0) = 0, c0 > 0 and c00 > 0. In the absence
of a monitoring scheme and assuming, for simplicity, an inﬁnite time horizon, the continuous time







f[z ¡ c(s)]dt + ¸sdtVe + (1 ¡ ¸sdt)Vu0(t + dt)g (A-1)
where the subscript 0 stands for the benchmark model without monitoring, r is the discount rate and
Ve is the expected lifetime utility of an employed worker. We do not specify Ve, but we just assume
that, for all t, Ve > Vu0(t). This assumption ensures that claimants accept all job offers. Rearranging
this relation, dividing by dt and taking the limit for dt ! 0 yields
rVu0(t) = Max
s
f[z ¡ c(s)] + ¸s[Ve ¡ Vu0(t)]g + _ Vu0(t) (A-2)
The optimal job search effort at time t, s0(t), must satisfy the following equation:
¸[Ve ¡ Vu0(t)] = c0[s0(t)] (A-3)
The marginal return to effort is equal to the marginal cost. Since Ve > Vu0(t), the effort will be strictly
positive everywhere. In addition, since all exogenous variables are stationary, the expected lifetime
utility and job search effort are constant over time: _ Vu0(t) = 0 and s0(t) = s0.
38This is not too strong an assumption. The probability of accepting job offers typically ranges between 90%
and 100% (see e.g. Devine, 1988; Wolpin, 1987; van den Berg, 1990).
31A-2 The impact of notifying the monitoring
Consider now that job search effort is monitored at some future moment t = tm > 0 and that the
worker is notiﬁed hereof today, at time t = 0. We make the simplifying assumption that the mon-
itoring agency observes job search effort without error and that it just requires the level of effort to
exceed a certain threshold ¹ s at any moment beyond tm: 8t ¸ tm : s(t) ¸ ¹ s.39 If the level of effort is
too low, the worker is sanctioned.
We now consider the impact of the new monitoring scheme on a worker for whom the search re-
quirement is binding. We will show that the monitoring will affect the proﬁle of job search s1(t) in
the following way: at the moment of notiﬁcation the job search effort will jump up; subsequently, it
will rise gradually until the tm; at tm it jumps up for a second time to the required level ¹ s, at which it
remains as long as the monitoring scheme is in force.
We solve the problem by backward induction. First observe that beyond tm the job search effort
is ﬁxed at the level of the search requirement and the expected lifetime utility, Vu1(t), is station-
ary. Since the search constraint is binding, we must have that approaching tm from the right, at
t = lim
dt!0
(tm + dt) ´ t+
m, the marginal return to job search must be lower than the marginal cost:
¸[Ve¡Vu1(t+
m)] < c0[s1(t+




the search constraint will not bind and therefore ¸[Ve ¡ Vu1(t¡
m)] = c0[s1(t¡
m)]. Since Vu1(t) is a state
variable, we have that Vu1(t¡
m) = Vu1(t+
m). Inserting the above mentioned conditions on search effort
in this equality yields c0[s1(t¡
m)] < c0[s1(t+
m)] and therefore s(t¡
m) < s(t+
m) = ¹ s: the job search effort
jumps upwards at t = tm.
We now prove that job search effort must be increasing as one approaches tm. To do so we ﬁrst show
that the expected lifetime utility is strictly decreasing.




The evolution of Vu1(t) is described by equation (A-2) in which Vu0(t) is replaced by Vu1(t) and
s is maximized over a constrained set (s ¸ ¹ s) beyond tm. At tm, _ Vu1(tm) = 0, so that
rVu1(tm) = z ¡ c(¹ s) + ¸¹ s[Ve ¡ Vu1(tm)] (A-4)
If we evaluate this expression at the suboptimal search intensity ¹ s at any t < tm, the following
inequality must be satisﬁed:
rVu1(t) > z ¡ c(¹ s) + ¸¹ s[Ve ¡ Vu1(t)] + _ Vu1(t) (A-5)
39Manning (2005) makes the same assumption. Since it allows us to reproduce the stylized facts, there is no
need for a more complicated assumption.
32Subtracting equation (A-4) from (A-5) yields:
(r + ¸¹ s)[Vu1(t) ¡ Vu1(tm)] > _ Vu1(t) (A-6)
We now prove by contradiction. Suppose that there exists some dt such that, for any t 2 [tm ¡
dt;tm], _ Vu1(t) ¸ 0. Consequently, Vu1(tm ¡ dt) · Vu1(tm), but this contradicts the inequality in
(A-6), since _ Vu1(t) ¸ 0 by assumption. Therefore there must exist a dt such that _ Vu1(t) < 0 for
any t 2 [tm ¡ dt;tm]. Taking the limit for dt ! 0 proves that _ Vu1(t¡
m) < 0.
2. 8t < tm : _ Vu1(t) < 0
Following a similar reasoning as above, for any dt and d¿, the following inequality must be
satisﬁed:
[r + ¸s(tm ¡ dt)][Vu1(tm ¡ dt ¡ d¿) ¡ Vu1(tm ¡ dt)] ¸ _ Vu1(tm ¡ dt ¡ d¿) ¡ _ Vu1(tm ¡ dt) (A-7)
The reasoning is again by contradiction. Choose dt such that _ Vu1(t) < 0 for all t 2 [tm ¡dt;tm].
Suppose that there exists some d¿ such that, for any t 2 [t ¡ dt ¡ d¿;t ¡ dt], _ Vu1(t) ¸ 0.
Consequently, Vu1(tm ¡dt¡d¿) · Vu1(tm ¡dt), but this can only satisfy the inequality (A-7) if
_ Vu1(tm¡dt¡d¿) < 0, since _ Vu1(tm¡dt) < 0. This contradicts our initial assumption. Therefore
there must exist a d¿ such that _ Vu1(t) < 0 for any t 2 [tm ¡ dt ¡ d¿;tm ¡ dt]. Repeating this
argument proves the proposition. 2
To derive the evolution of s1(t) for t · tm, we differentiate the ﬁrst-order condition (A-3) with respect
to t:




showing that job search effort must be increasing before tm. Finally, since the monitoring just imposes
a constraint on the unemployed claimant, it must be that Vu0(0) > Vu1(0). Using the ﬁrst-order
condition (A-3), this implies that s0(0) < s1(0), i.e. that the job search effort jumps upwards at the
moment of notiﬁcation.
A-3 The impact of simultaneously counseling notiﬁed claimants
The model in the previous section captures the stylized features of the monitoring scheme in Flan-
ders. In Wallonia, however, the notiﬁcation is immediately followed by counseling at the Regional
Employment Ofﬁce. In this section we consider the impact of this additional counseling on job search
behavior.
For simplicity, we assume that counseling just increases the effectiveness of job-search: ¸2 > ¸. The
ﬁrst order condition of optimal job search is therefore given by
¸2[Ve ¡ Vu2(t)] = c0[s2(t)] (A-9)
Counseling increases the returns to job search, so that s2(t) ¸ s1(t) for all t. It will therefore also imply
that the job search requirement imposed by the monitoring scheme will be binding for a smaller
number of workers. The increasing proﬁle in the transition rate to employment should therefore
33be observed for a smaller number of workers, unless participation in other training programs (not
modeled) results in a steeper proﬁle.
A-4 The impact of announcing that both monitoring and counseling will take
place at some future date
In Brussels shortly after being notiﬁed of the future monitoring, the worker is convoked to a collec-
tive meeting in which he/she is informed about the workings of the UI scheme. At this meeting, one
announces in addition that the claimants will be counseled individually shortly after the ﬁrst moni-
toring interview has taken place. In this section, we demonstrate that this announcement may reverse
the threat effect of monitoring. Intuitively, the argument goes as follows. In the previous section we
have demonstrated that counseling increases the returns to job search and that the worker therefore
voluntary intensiﬁes job search. Consequently, the job search requirements will no longer be binding
for a number of workers. If so, the prospect of counseling will dominate the threat of monitoring: the
worker will be better off after tm then before. This will reduce his job search effort before tm.
Consider a worker whose job search intensity, as a consequence of counseling, increases above the
requirements imposed by the monitoring scheme: s3(tm) > ¹ s. Denote the expected lifetime utility of
this worker by Vu3(t). Following a similar argumentation to the one in Section 1, we can show that
the job search effort should jump upwards at time tm. To determine the evolution of s(t) before tm,
we ﬁrst prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2: 8t · tm : _ Vu3(t) > 0
Proof:
Using the ﬁrst-order conditions (A-3) and (A-9), for the job search intensity, respectively before and
after tm, one can derive a condition similar to the one deﬁned in equation (A-7):
r[Vu3(t+
m ¡ d¿) ¡ Vu3(t+
m ¡ dt ¡ d¿)] ¸
£
c0[s3(t+
m ¡ d¿)] ¡ c0[s3(t+





m ¡ d¿) ¡ _ Vu3(t+
m ¡ dt ¡ d¿) (A-10)
Consider ﬁrst d¿ = 0 and assume that _ Vu3(t) · 0 for all t 2 [tm ¡ dt;tm]. In this case the above
inequality (A-10) cannot be satisﬁed, since then Vu3(t+
m) · Vu3(t+
m ¡ dt), but also _ Vu3(t+
m) = 0 and
c0[s3(t+
m)] > c0[tm ¡ dt], a contradiction. Consequently, there must exist some d¿ > 0 such that
_ Vu3(t) > 0 for all t 2 [tm ¡ d¿;tm].
Assume now that there exists a dt > 0 such that _ Vu3(t) · 0 for all t 2 [tm ¡ dt ¡ d¿;tm ¡ d¿]. This
contradicts again the above inequality, since (a) it implies that Vu3(t+
m ¡ d¿) · Vu3(t+
m ¡ dt ¡ d¿),
which in turn by (A-9) implies that c0[s3(t+
m ¡ d¿)] ¸ c0[s3(t+
m ¡ dt ¡ d¿) and (b) _ Vu3(t ¡ d¿) > 0, so
that (A-10) can only be satisﬁed if _ Vu3(tm ¡ dt ¡ d¿) > 0, a contradiction. Repeating this argument
proves that _ Vu3(t) > 0 for t < tm. 2
Inserting this in (A-8) in which we replace the sub-indices "1" to "3", it follows that the job-search
intensity must decrease for all t < tm. In addition, since the counseling increases the welfare of the
34Figure A-1: The Evolution of Job-Search Effort
unemployed worker, Vu3(0) > Vu0(0), it follows from (A-3), in which we replace the sub-index appro-
priately, that job search effort falls discontinuously at the moment at which the worker is informed
that he will be counseled (and monitored) at time tm: s3(0) < s0(0). Consequently, the employment
probability of this worker decreases relative to the pre-reform level until tm, after which it will in-
crease to a higher level. This proﬁle will not be observed for all workers, however. All depends on
the perceived quality of the the counseling relative to the stringency of the job search requirements.
The latter can compensate or dominate the former, implying respectively no or a positive effect on
the employment probability prior to tm.
Figure A-1 summarizes the time-paths of the job-search effort s(t) from the moment of dispatch of
the notiﬁcation letter t = 0 to the moment t = tm of the monitoring (and possibly counseling) for the
cases considered in this Appendix. Note that qualitatively the evolution of s2(t) corresponds to that
of s1(t).
35Table A-1: Local Average Treatment Effects of the Predetermined Variables and
of the Number of Individuals by Age Classy
Brussels Flanders Wallonia
Variables Coefﬁcient (s.e.) Coefﬁcient (s.e.) Coefﬁcient (s.e.)
# individuals by age-group(a) 2,061 (1.507) 1,022 (1.707) -1,777 (1.746)
Sex
men -0.047 (0.054) -0.062* (0.037) 0.041 (0.036)
women 0.047 (0.047) 0.061 (0.038) -0.041 (0.036)
Nationality
Belgian 0.015 (0.050) 0.003 (0.025) -0.026 (0.032)
EU15 (excluding Belgian) -0.016 (0.037) -0.001 (0.016) 0.023 (0.026)
Others 0.001 (0.043) -0.002 (0.022) 0.003 (0.015)
Schooling level
primary -0.061 (0.037) -0.037 (0.031) 0.022 (0.038)
lower secondary 0.033 (0.044) 0.082** (0.035) 0.024 (0.033)
upper secondary -0.054 (0.055) -0.012 (0.040) -0.042 (0.041)
higher education 0.057 (0.045) -0.035 (0.037) -0.000 (0.032)
other studies 0.024 (0.050) 0.002 (0.003) -0.003 (0.020)
Category
head of household -0.052 (0.053) 0.042 (0.035) 0.043 (0.037)
single 0.020 (0.052) -0.009 (0.033) 0.035 (0.035)
cohabitant 0.032 (0.052) -0.032 (0.040) -0.067* (0.038)
Type of entitlement
work experience 0.060 (0.040) 0.007(b) (0.019) 0.029 (0.033)
school-leaver -0.060 (0.039) -0.007(b) (0.019) -0.029(c) (0.031)
Participation in training 0.001 (0.023) 0.026 (0.024) -0.031 (0.025)
UI duration in months -0.301 (0.728) 0.622 (0.481) -0.221 (0.500)
Recent UI interruption 0.021 (0.064) -0.021 (0.037) 0.026 (0.035)
Unemployment rate by district - - 0.092 (0.146) -0.162 (0.428)
Number of observations 1346 2519 2413
y Model with a linear polynomial in age, unless speciﬁed otherwise. To allow for speciﬁcation error
induced by the grouping of age in monthly intervals, we adjust the standard errors for clustering within
these groups (Lee and Card, 2006).
(a) Age measured in months. This approximates McCrary’s test on the continuity of the density of the
running variable.
(b) 3rd degree polynomial in age.
(c) 2nd degree polynomial in age.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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